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The most Secret Memory of Men and the Disgraceful Condemnation of Two African Authors

By Jan Lundius
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Jan 6 2025 – In 2021, the Senegalese novelist Mohamed Mbougar Sarr became the first writer from sub-Saharan Africa to be awarded the Prix Goncourt, France’s oldest and most prestigious literary prize.

Literature

His novel, La plus secrète mémoire des hommes, The most Secret Memory of Men, tells the story of a young Senegalese writer living in Paris, who by chance stumbles across a novel published in 1938 by an elusive Senegalese author named T.C. Elimane. This author had once been hailed by an ecstatic Paris press, but had then disappeared from view. Elimane had before every trace of him had vanished, been accused of plagiarism. After losing a legal process connected with the plagiarism charge, Elimane’s publisher had been forced to withdraw and destroy all available copies of The Labyrinth of Inhumanity. However, a few extremely rare copies of the novel remained, profoundly affecting anyone who happened to read them. The novel’s main protagonist (there are several others) eventually became involved in a desperate search for the illusive Elimane, who had left some rare imprints in France, Senegal and Argentina.

A reader of Sarr’s multifaceted, exquisitely written novel is confronted with a choir of different voices mixing, harmonizing and/or contradicting each other. The story turns into a labyrinth, where boundaries between fiction and reality become blurred and lose ends remain unravelled. Sarr moves in an ocean of world literature. It seems as if he has read everything worth reading and allusions are either in plain sight, or remain invisible. Ultimately, the novel investigates the limits between myth and reality, memory and presence, and above all the question – what is storytelling? What is literature? Does it concern the “truth”, or is it constructing a parallel version of reality?

A disturbing issue shimmers below the surface of the intriguing story. Why were two excellent West-African authors before Sarr severely scrutinized and condemned for plagiarism? Why were they accused of not being “African” enough? Are African writers doomed to linger within a shadowy existence as exotic curiosities, judged from the outside by a prejudiced literary establishment, which persistently consider African authors, except white Nobel laureates like Gordimer and Coetze, either as being exotic natives, or epigons of European literature?

The most Secret Memory of Men has a disturbing prehistory, echoing real-life experiences of the Guinean writer Camara Laye and the likewise unfortunate Malian Yambo Ouologuem.

At the age of 15, Camara Laye came to Conakry, the French colonial capital of Guinea, to attended vocational studies in motor mechanics. In 1947, he travelled to Paris to continue his studies in mechanics. In 1956, Camara Laye returned to Africa, first to Dahomey, then to the Gold Coast and finally to newly independent Guinea, where he held several government posts. In 1965, after being subject to political persecution, he left Guinea for Senegal and never returned to his home country.

In 1954, Camara Laye’s novel Le regard de Roi, The Radiance of the King, was published in Paris and at the time described as “one of the finest works of fiction to come out of Africa”. The novel was quite odd, and remains so, particular since its main protagonist is a white man and the story develops from his point of view. Clarence has, after in his home country having failed at most things, recently arrived in Africa to seek his fortune there. After gambling all his money away, he is thrown out of his hotel and in desperation decides to pursue a legend stating that somewhere in the inner depths of Africa a wealthy king can be found. Clarence hopes that this king might provide for him, maybe give him a job, and a purpose in life.

Laye’s novel becomes an allegory for man’s search for God. Clarence’s journey develops into a road to self-realisation and he obtains wisdom through a series of dreamlike and humiliating experiences; often harrowing, sometimes lunatically nightmarish, though the story is occasionally lightened by an absurd and alluring humour.

However, some critics asked if this really was an African novel. The language was beguilingly simple, but the allegorical mode of telling the story made critics assume that it was tinged with Christianity, that the African lore was “superficial”, and the narrative style “kafkaesque”. Even African authors considered that Laye “mimicked” European literary role models. The Nigerian author Wole Soyinka characterized Le regard de Roi as a feeble imitation of Kafka’s novel The Castle, implanted on African soil and within France suspicions soon arose that a young African car mechanic could not have been able to write such a strange and multifaceted novel as Le regard de Roi.

This unkind and even mean criticism became increasingly vociferous, deprecating what was actually an intriguing work of genius. The harassment continued until a final blow was delivered by an American professor. Adele King’s comprehensive study The Writing of Camara Laye did in 1981 “prove” that Le regard de Roi actually had been written by Francis Soulé, a renegade Belgian intellectual who in Brussels had been involved in Nazi- and Anti-Semitic propaganda and after World War II had been forced to establish himself in France. According to Adele King, Soulé had together with Robert Poulet, editor at Plon, the publisher that issued Le regard de Roi, concocted a story that his novel actually had been written by a young African, thus securing its success. To support her theory, Adele King presented an exhaustive account of Camara Laye’s life in France, tracing his various acquaintances and coming to the conclusion that Laye had been paid by Plon to act as the author of Le regard de Roi.

Among other observations Adele King stated that Laye’s novel was of an “un-African nature, with a European sense of literary form”, thus indicating Francis Soulé’s handiwork. This in spite of Soulé’s very meagre literary output (King mentions that he had in his ”youth dabbled in exotic writing”) and the fact that Laye wrote several other, very good novels.

Among other indications that Laye could not have written Le regard de Roi, King argued that the novel’s “Messianic message” sounded false, originating as it did from an African Muslim. She thus ignored that Laye came from a Sufi tradition where similar notions abounded and when it came to the “kafkaesque” flavour of the novel, which is far from being overwhelming – why could not a young African author living in France, like so many others, have been inspired by Franz Kafka’s writing?

Notwithstanding, through these and many other shaky assumptions King concluded that Le regard de Roi had been written by the otherwise almost unknown Francis Soulé and her verdict became almost unanimously accepted. It did for example in 2018 prominently appear in Christoffer Miller’s popular and otherwise quiet good book Impostors: Literary Hoaxes and Cultural Authenticity.

Another resounding condemnation of an excellent West-African author occurred in 1968 when the groundbreaking and original novel Le devoir de violence, Bound to Violence, after a short time of praise was smashed due to accusations of plagiarism. Le devoir de violence dealt with seven centuries of violent history of an African, fictious kingdom (actually quite akin to present-day Mali). In a feverish first-rate, free flowing language the novel does not shy away from depicting extreme violence, royal oppression, religious superstition, murder, corruption, slavery, female genital mutilation, rape, misogyny, and abuse of power. All intermingled with episodes of real love and harmony, but there is no doubt about Yambo Ouologuem’s opinion that a powerful, age-old and corrupt African elite enriched itself and prospered through its collaboration with an equally corrupt and brutal colonial power, all done for their respective gain.

Quite expectedly, Ouologuem arose violent reactions from authors adhering to the concept of négritude, denoting a framework of critique and literary theory developed by francophone intellectuals, who stressed the strength of African solidarity and notions about a unique African culture. Ouologuem provided the négritude movement with his own denigrating term – negraille, accusing négritude authors of ingraining servility and an inferiority complex in Africa’s black population. He accused such authors of depicting Africa as a ridiculous Paradise, when the continent in fact had been, and was, just as corrupt and violent as its European counterpart. Ouologuem also wondered why an African writer could not be allowed to be as critical, outspoken and politically improper as, for example, the French authors Rimbaud and Céline.

The final judgment that befell Ouologuem was delivered by the generally admired Graham Greene, who launched a lawsuit against Ouologuem’s publisher accusing the African author of plagiarizing parts of Greene’s novel It’s a Battlefield. Greene won the lawsuit and Ouologuem’s novel was banned in France and the publisher had to see to the destruction of all available copies of it. Ouologuem did not write another novel, he returned to Mali where he in a small town directed a youth centre, until he withdrew in a secluded Muslim life as a marabout (spiritual advisor).

Considering the framework of Ouologuem’s entire and quite mindboggling novel, Graham Greene’s reaction appears to be petty, if not outright ridiculous. The plagiarism was limited to a few sentences describing a French mansion, which in itself was quite absurd within its African setting, and the description is clearly quoted with a satirical intention (in his novel Greene described a slightly ridiculously decorated apartment of an English communist).

The condemnation of Laye’s, and in particular Ouologuem’s novels may be discerned as an inspiration to Mohamed Sarr’s novel. Sarr writes about a young African author finding himself in a limbo between two very different worlds, Senegal and France, while he has found home and solace in literature, a world within which he has discovered a real gem, his talisman – Elimane’s novel. However, the bewildered young man’s pursuit of the man behind the book turns out to be in vain, and so is probably also his search for himself in this labyrinth that constitutes our life and the world we live in.

Sarr’s novel reminds us of the fate of two other West-African authors before him, who were accused of not being “genuine”, of being “plagiarists”, thus Sarr also succeeds in asking us what is genuine in a floating globalized world?

IPS UN Bureau

 


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Why Russia’s Ban on Child-Free ‘Propaganda’ Impacts Human Rights

Big families are promoted on billboards in Russia. Credit: Sky News screengrab

Big families are promoted on billboards in Russia. Credit: Sky News screengrab

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Jan 6 2025 – “A lot of people are very scared,” says Zalina Marshenkulova. “This is obviously another tool of repression. The state is waging war on the remnants of free-thinking people in Russia and trying to suppress all dissent and freedom,” the Russian feminist activist tells IPS.

The warning from Marshenkulova, who left Russia soon after the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and now lives in Germany, comes just days after new legislation came into force in her home country banning “child-free propaganda.”

Under the law, any person, organisation or government official deemed to be promoting a “child-free” lifestyle or encouraging people, either in person or online, not to have children can face huge fines and, in some cases, may be deported.

While MPs have stressed the legislation would not infringe on the right of individuals not to have children, critics fear it will be used in what some have described as an ongoing “crusade” by the Kremlin to promote a deeply conservative ideology centred around ‘traditional values’ and rejecting decadent Western ways of life—even at the expense of women’s reproductive rights.

“Women are already buying up all sorts of contraceptive pills [fearing they may not be able to get them in the future]. Abortions are already hard to get and that’s only going to get even harder now,” says Marshenkulova.

The legislation, which came into effect on December 4, introduces fines for individuals spreading “child-free propaganda” in broadcast media or online of up to 400,000 rubles (€3,840), while companies doing so can be fined up to 5 million rubles (€48,000) for the same offence. Foreign citizens who fall foul of the legislation will face deportation.

Its supporters have said the legislation is essential to protect Russia against a harmful Western ideology that could have devastating consequences for a country struggling with worrying negative demographic trends.

“We are talking about protecting citizens, primarily the younger generation, from information disseminated in the media space that has a negative impact on the formation of people’s personalities,” Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the lower house of parliament, said ahead of the vote. “Everything must be done to ensure that new generations of our citizens grow up centred on traditional family values.”

But human rights groups and activists say they have grave concerns about it. They point out that it has similarly vague language to other repressive laws passed in Russia in recent years that have been used to persecute minorities, such as LGBT+ people, and government critics, including civil society groups, as well as opponents of the invasion of Ukraine.

The relative novelty of the legislation means it is hard to gauge how strictly it will be implemented and what exactly authorities will see as ‘childfree propaganda’.

But it has already had some effect.

“The law is vague and broadly formulated so we can’t predict what things will be considered punishable—no one knows,” Anastasiia Zakharova, a lawyer at the Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre, told IPS.

“For example, a situation where women share publicly things like how hard it can be as a mother, how difficult it can be raising kids—will that be considered childfree propaganda? We have already seen that groups on social media where women talk about how hard it is raising children and being a mother have closed down to avoid potentially being fined. This law will have a chilling effect on what people will say,” she added.

Others say experience with Russian laws such as those introduced in the last decade banning “LGBT+ propaganda” provides a guide for how this legislation could impact women’s lives.

“This is another part of the Kremlin’s harmful ‘traditional values’ crusade. It will limit women’s freedom, their reproductive freedoms, and will stifle freedom generally,” Tanya Lokshina, Europe and Central Asia associate director at Human Rights Watch (HRW), told IPS.

“We can predict what the effects of this law will be because it is similar to the anti-LGBT+ propaganda law in Russia and we have seen the effects of that. It’s not so much that this kind of law targets individuals; it’s about purging the cultural arena of anything that could be even vaguely interpreted as propaganda,” she added.

She said while this could see a vast amount of films, shows and books disappearing from shop shelves, TV schedules, and online streaming services—”for example, a ‘romcom’ film in which you see a woman in her thirties with no children pursuing her career—anything like that is going to be outlawed. Can you imagine how many films, TV shows, books, etc. might have to be banned because of that? It’s mind-boggling,” she said—it could also significantly impact reproductive health.

“Will children be able to get information about abortion and birth control? We saw what happened with the anti-LGBT+ law when teachers and others who should have been helping them could not, or would not, talk about [LGBT+ sexual health issues]. If children needed help, they couldn’t get it,” she said.

Other rights activists agreed.

“There will be problems for women to get information about abortions, contraception, and other reproductive health matters and it will be particularly difficult for young people who already might already be struggling with getting hold of information on these things and now won’t have any way at all to access it,” Natalia Morozova, Head of the Eastern Europe/Central Asia Desk at the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), told IPS.

This comes at a time when women’s access to abortion is already being curtailed.

Elective abortion is legal in Russia up to the 12th week of pregnancy, and in some exceptional cases, such as rape, up to the 22nd week. However, in recent years there have been moves to limit access to the procedure.

Laws have been introduced in some regions outlawing “coercing” women—the legislation defines this as persuading, bribing, or deceiving a woman into undergoing the procedure—to have an abortion, while hundreds of private clinics across the country have followed a ‘voluntarily initiative’ supported by the Health Ministry and have stopped offering abortions.

The state has also introduced guidelines for doctors to encourage female patients to have children, but also to dissuade them from abortions.

“Already in state clinics in Russia, doctors put pressure on women to have children. There are women who have gone to a clinic and been questioned by doctors on why they have no children and why they don’t want to have them yet,” said Lokshina.

Health experts have already pointed to the dangers of restricting abortions, with World Health Organisation (WHO) officials previously warning that bans on private clinics performing abortions would force more women in Russia into having surgical abortions rather than medical abortions. Private clinics mainly offer medical abortions, whereas state hospitals perform surgical abortions, which carry higher risks of complications, side effects and injuries.

The WHO also raised concerns that tightening access to legal abortions could lead to a spike in dangerous illegal procedures.

This tightening of access to abortion and the passing of the ‘childfree propaganda’ law come as the Kremlin battles a demographic crisis amid rising mortality as Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine grinds on and the country’s birth rate falls.

Data from statistics service Rosstat showed 599,600 children were born in Russia in the first half of 2024, which is 16,000 fewer births year-on-year and the lowest figure since 1999. Meanwhile, the number of newborns fell 6 percent in June to 98,600, which is the first time the number fell below 100,000. There were 325,100 deaths recorded between January and June, which is 49,000 more than in the same period of 2023.

The Kremlin has called the demographic situation a “catastrophe” for the nation and lawmakers who backed the ‘childfree propaganda’ legislation see it as a way to help halt population decline.

But Morozova said the Kremlin’s main motive was bolstering its armed forces to continue fighting in Ukraine.

“They want a population that produces soldiers, women that produce soldiers. The only goal of this regime is to produce as many soldiers as possible,” she said.

According to Lokshina, the law will also give the Kremlin an extra tool in its fight against a group that many experts see as potentially the biggest threat to President Putin’s hold on power.

“The most notable protests [against the Russian regime] since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have been women’s protests. The Kremlin sees women as being problematic and wants to silence them,” she said.

While it remains to be seen how the law will be implemented and interpreted by authorities in the future, some activists have already left the country in response to its passage, fearing it could be used against them.

But there are doubts the legislation will have any effect on the birth rate.

Some Russian women who spoke to western media ahead of the legislation’s approval said women’s decisions on whether to have children or not are largely rooted in financial concerns at a time when the economy is struggling, rather than anyone else’s opinion on their right to have children or not.

And research carried out by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) in October showed that 66 percent of Russians doubted fines for promoting childfree ideology would be effective.

“The law has no potential to influence the birth rate,” said Lokshina. “It is aimed at stifling dissent—in this case, the rejection of so-called traditional family values.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 


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