Credit: Kim Kyung-Hoon/Reuters via Gallo Images
By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Aug 4 2025 – Rice queues – something once unthinkable – began appearing around May. As the country’s staple food hit record prices, frustrated shoppers found themselves breaking a cultural taboo by switching to rice from South Korea. It was a symbol of how far Japan’s economic certainties had crumbled, creating fertile ground for a political shift.
That came on 20 July, when Japan joined the ranks of countries where far-right parties are gaining ground. The Sanseitō party took 15.7 per cent of the vote in the election for parliament’s upper house, while the ruling two-party coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kōmeitō lost its majority. The result spells trouble for Japan’s civil society.
From conspiracy theories to parliament
Sanseitō, founded during the COVID-19 pandemic, grew out of a right-wing YouTube channel. Initially, it spread virus conspiracy theories and opposed masks and vaccines, territory that globally provided entry points for far-right radicalisation. Since then, it’s embraced exclusionary politics.
The party’s leader, Sohei Kamiya, says he wants to be Japan’s Trump. His ‘Japan First’ agenda, accompanied by an abundance of xenophobic rhetoric, urges strict immigration limits.
Sanseitō shows deep hostility towards excluded groups. It strongly opposes LGBTQI+ rights, even though these are limited in Japan, calling for repeal of the 2023 LGBT Understanding Promotion Act. The party opposes same-sex marriage; despite civil society legal action leading to mixed court judgments, Japan remains the only G7 country to not recognise marriage equality.
Kamiya has blamed young women for Japan’s declining birthrate, saying they’re too career-focused and should stay home and have children. He’s has also said he supports Trump’s moves to eliminate climate protections and calls for Japan’s militarisation, positions right-wing populists are commonly taking around the world.
Economic crisis and political corruption
Change has been coming in Japan’s previously static politics. The LDP, a big tent right-wing party, has been in power, either on its own or with Kōmeitō, for almost all of the time since its 1955 founding. It long enjoyed credit for reconstructing Japan’s shattered post-Second World War economy and rebuilding international relationships through a strongly US-aligned foreign policy.
But its dominance has crumbled under economic stagnation and corruption scandals. The LDP lost its lower house majority in a snap October 2024 election, called by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba after he assumed leadership following his predecessor’s scandal-forced resignation.
In November 2023, it was revealed that some US$4 million had been hidden in unreported and illegal slush funds linked to key party factions. This scandal followed the July 2022 assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, whose killer harboured a grudge against the Unification Church, a religious movement widely considered a cult. The killing threw the spotlight on extensive links between the church and LDP.
Political crisis coincided with economic malaise. Inflation is rare in Japan, but in common with many other countries, food prices have spiked and pay hasn’t kept pace. The rice crisis, partly due by extreme weather impacts caused by climate change, provided the most potent symbol, affecting a staple food deeply embedded in national identity. The government reacted to high prices by releasing some of its reserve stock, but refused calls to cut the 10 per cent consumption tax, which Sanseitō wants to abolish.
Demographics and immigration fears
Underlying these economic problem lies Japan’s demographic challenge. An estimated 30 per cent of people are aged 65 or over, and around 10 per cent are 80-plus. The flipside is a low fertility rate: each woman is currently predicted to have 1.2 children, far below the 2.1 rate needed to maintain a stable population.
Japan’s demographics threaten to undermine its economic base, since there may not be enough taxpayers to fund social security spending. A previously reluctant government has been forced to ease tight immigration controls and bring in more working-age people. Foreign-born residents now comprise around three per cent of Japan’s population, a small proportion for most global north economies but a highly visible change in a previously broadly homogenous society.
Sanseitō has weaponised this demographic shift, unleashing xenophobic rhetoric to tap into anxieties about cultural change, blaming foreigners for domestic problems. Anxiety about the birthrate has also provided ample ground to scapegoat feminism and LGBTQI+ rights movements.
Political disengagement and generational divides
The political establishment’s failure to connect with younger generations also created a dangerous vulnerability. Research in 2024 showed that only a third of voters were satisfied with the way Japan’s democracy currently works, and over half didn’t identify with any political party. Disaffection is widest among young people, exacerbated by the reality that politicians are typically a generation or two older.
The swing towards Sanseitō suggests that at least some disenchanted with established politics found something to vote for. The party draws support particularly from young people, and especially young men. It’s aided by having a much stronger social media presence than established parties, with around 500,000 YouTube followers compared to the LDP’s 140,000.
In many countries, it was once a safe assumption that young people were more progressive than older generations, but increasingly that no longer holds. In economies where young people are struggling, anything that looks new and promises to break with failed establishment politics, even when extremist, can be appealing.
Instability and polarisation ahead
Sanseitō says it doesn’t want to work with any established party and, as has been seen in other countries, may use its parliamentary presence to mount stunts and court publicity. Its support is unlikely to have peaked, and even though it doesn’t have power, it can expect influence: once far-right rhetoric moves from into the mainstream, it seeps into and shifts the broader political debate.
Japan’s rightward tilt could extend beyond Sanseitō. Unhappiness with the LDP saw another right-wing party, the Democratic Populist Party, pick up support. These shifts could cause the LDP to respond to its losses by taking a more nationalist and conservative tack, as associated with its former leader Abe.
Japan’s trajectory mirrors concerning patterns across global north democracies such as France, Germany, Italy and Portugal, where right-wing populist parties have gained profile by provoking outrage, sowing division and targeting excluded groups, alongside the civil society that defends their rights.
This all suggests danger for Japan’s excluded groups and civil society. As Japan steps along this troubling path, its civil society needs to be ready to make the case for human rights. What began as a rice crisis has evolved into a test of whether Japan’s democratic institutions, including its civil society, can withstand a gathering populist storm.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
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