Beyond the Fields: Unraveling Zambia’s Drought Crisis and the Urgent Call for Climate-Health Solutions

Laban Munsaka of Pemba District in Southern Province, farm is impacted by El Nino climate-induced prolonged dry spell. Credit: Friday Phiri/IPS

Laban Munsaka of Pemba District in Southern Province, farm is impacted by El Nino climate-induced prolonged dry spell. Credit: Friday Phiri/IPS

By Friday Phiri
LUSAKA, May 8 2024 – For most families in Zambia, April is traditionally a month of plenty—it is typically the beginning of a harvest season for various food and cash crops. Both fresh and dried maize, groundnuts, pumpkins, and a whole variety of both traditional and exotic food crops are usually in full supply and readily available for consumption, supporting household food security and nutrition.

Similarly, during this period, most families’ income levels tend to be high and sound, supportive of family demands ranging from school fees to health care and grocery needs, as they sell various cash crops. It is, in summary, the beginning of the crop marketing season and a period of positive expectations.

This farming season, however, the story of millions of households, including that of Laban Munsaka of Pemba District in Southern Province, is gravely depressing. Munsaka’s family is part of the over six million people from over a million households in Zambia estimated to be facing acute food shortages and possible malnutrition until the next growing season, which is twelve months away.

Due to the El Nino climate-induced prolonged dry spell, half of the estimated 2.2 million hectares of maize planted in the 2023–24 farming season have been destroyed. According to Zambia’s President, Hakainde Hichilema, the debilitating dry spell lasted for more than five weeks at a time when farmers needed rain the most.

“In view of these challenges, urgent and decisive action is required from all of us,” Hichilema said in his address when he declared the situation a disaster and national emergency, earlier in March 2024. “The government, in accordance with the Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 2010, and other relevant legislation, declares the prolonged dry spell a national disaster and emergency,” he said, adding that the prolonged dry spell had affected 84 of the country’s 116 districts, negatively impacting more than a million farming households.

“It’s really difficult to compare last season to what has happened this farming season,” Munsaka narrates. “I harvested 100 by 50kg bags of maize last season but I don’t know what we might get from this destroyed field, it is just zero work this season,” he laments, pointing at his destroyed maize crop field.

With a relatively huge family of over 20 members to support, Munsaka is not only worried about the eminent food insecurity but also nutrition and other health-related challenges that may likely emerge from poor nutrition intake.

“I have a bigger family,” he says. “As you know, in such situations, our focus is only on food availability. Our focus is survival. We don’t usually care about the nutrition component.”

With dwindling pasture for grazing and expected water scarcity for livestock, animal welfare is likely to be compromised, leading to possible disease outbreaks such as nutritional anthrax, putting at risk both animal and human populations.

In a climate-induced drought environment, Munsaka’s worries about food insecurity, reduced nutrition options and eminent health challenges may not be far-fetched. There is increasing scientific evidence indicating how climate change is, and continues to significantly impact the physical, biological, and mental health of individuals.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report (AR6), climate-related illnesses, premature deaths, malnutrition in all its forms, and threats to mental health and well-being are increasing.

For example, scientific evidence indicates that dwindling water security is leading to rising cases of waterborne diseases and an overall collapse of sanitation and hygiene, while frequent and intensified droughts and floods are said to be contributing to loss of agricultural productivity, leading to food insecurity and subsequently malnutrition.

Similarly, science experts are pointing fingers at rising temperature conditions as a contributing factor to the expansion of vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever into higher altitudes and previously colder regions of the world.

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that if urgent interventions to tame climate change are not implemented, approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year could be recorded from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhea, and heat stress alone. This is in addition to estimated economic losses of USD 2-4 billion per year by 2030.

While the situation is as dire as described, health is not part of the mainstream agenda of climate negotiations at global level.

It is worth noting, however, that there have been efforts at the global and regional levels to address the impacts of climate change on health. At COP26 in Glasgow, the health community reached an important milestone in bringing human health at the forefront of climate change work.

For the first time in the UNFCCC negotiations, a health programme was promoted, led by the UK government as the President of COP26, the World Health Organization (WHO), Health Care Without Harm (HCWH) and the UNFCCC Climate Champions.

Two of the programme’s key initiatives were to support countries in developing climate resilient and low carbon sustainable health systems, with countries announcing their commitments to develop and invest in climate resilient and low carbon sustainable health systems and facilities.

Since COP26, Amref Health Africa, working with WHO and other partners, has been leading climate and health efforts, culminating into the first ever Health Day dedicated to health issues at COP28, at which stakeholders made further commitments in a health declaration.

As parties prepare for the UNFCCC 60th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB60) in Bonn, Germany, next month, the health community is also gearing to continue playing an active role in the negotiations.

“This is the time to seize the growing momentum across the globe, on the need to pool resources, knowledge, and creativity towards a forward-looking climate and health agenda to respond not only to the challenges of today but also anticipate the challenges of tomorrow,” says Desta Lakew, Amref Health Africa Group Director for Partnerships and External Affairs. “We must encourage and foster collaborations across disciplines, including environmental science, public health, epidemiology, economics, and social sciences, to address the multifaceted nature of climate change impacts on health.”

Based on this call, Amref Zambia is actively engaging the Ministry of Green Economy and Environment (MGEE) on the intersectionality of climate change and health, in view of not only the current situation but also future circumstances likely to emerge from the negative effects of climate change on the health sector.

Amref Zambia Country Manager, Viviane Sakanga, expresses delight at the opportunity to engage and Amref’s desire to collaborate on key climate and health interventions for better health outcomes amid the climate crisis.

“Evidence is abounding on how climate change is affecting health. It is for this reason that we believe, and have included the climate crisis as a key social determinant and driver of change in our 2023–2030 Corporate Strategy. We are keen to collaborate on climate and health,” said Sakanga when she recently met with the Director of Green Economy and Climate Change at the Ministry, Ephraim Mwepya Shitima.

On his part, Shitima welcomed Amref’s patronage and pledged the department’s readiness to work with like-minded institutions for meaningful climate action at all levels and in all sectors.

Ephraim Mwepya Shitima said, “it may interest you to know that Zambia identified the health sector for climate intervention as early as 2007. In implementing Article 4.9 of the Climate Convention, the COP in 2001, established the Least Developed Countries (LDC) work programme that included the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) to support LDCs to address the challenge of climate change given their particular vulnerability. In 2007, Zambia identified health as one of the priority sectors that required support under this work programme. Equally, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), which was submitted last year also highlights health as a priority sector. We are therefore delighted and welcome your active involvement in the climate change and health action space.”

Amidst all, Munsaka and other millions of Zambians affected by the current and future climate-induced challenges are yearning for holistic support interventions focused not only food availability but also nutrition and health.

With the situation already declared a disaster by the Republican President, government and stakeholders continue to seek for integrated interventions.

Note: The author is Climate Change Health Advocacy Lead at Amref Health Africa

 

IPS UN Bureau Report

 


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The Enormous Risks & Uncertain Benefits of an Israeli Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities

View of Tehran, Iran’s capital. Among other things, the JCPOA envisages lifting of sanctions, bringing “tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people”. Credit: Unsplash/Anita Filabi

By Assaf Zoran
CAMBRIDGE, Massachusetts, May 8 2024 – Iran’s unprecedented attack on Israel on April 13 has significantly escalated the tensions between the countries. For the first time, a declared and extensive Iranian military operation was carried out on Israeli territory. Now, the decision on how to respond rests with Israel. A direct war between the two countries now no longer seems unlikely.

Israel now realizes that it underestimated the consequences of its attack on an Iranian facility in Damascus that killed several senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps earlier this month. However, the exceptionally large scope of Iran’s response and the direct impact on Israeli soil is viewed in Israel as a disproportionate action that significantly escalates the conflict.

Despite the interception of most of the weapons launched by Iran and the lack of significant damage on Israeli territory, the outcome of the Iranian attack could have been vastly different due to the uncertainties of combat. Consequently, in Israel, there is a strong focus on Iran’s intentions and Tehran’s willingness to risk a direct confrontation.

Since Israel does not want to depend solely on defense and aims to prevent the normalization of attacks on its territory, it appears resolute to respond, reinforce its deterrence, and inflict a significant cost that will make Iran’s decision-makers think twice before attacking similarly again.

While some in Israel advocate for a robust immediate response to project power and display independence despite international pressures, others prefer a more cautious and measured reaction to limit the risk of escalating into a major regional war.

Several main response options are under consideration, possibly in combination: a diplomatic move, such as forming a regional defensive coalition against Iran and its armed allies in the “axis of resistance,” or revitalizing international efforts against Iran’s nuclear program; a covert kinetic operation, like past operations attributed to Israel targeting nuclear or missile facilities; or an overt kinetic military initiative, such as a missile or aircraft strike on Iranian territory.

Both covert and overt kinetic actions can vary in intensity and target different sectors—military, governmental, or nuclear.

Currently, there is significant attention on the potential for Israel to execute a kinetic move against Iranian nuclear sites, covertly or overtly. Iran itself recently closed these facilities due to security concerns—a move noted by the international community, including the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, who stated that inspectors have been temporarily withdrawn.

Within Israel, some perceive the current situation as an opportunity to impair Iran’s nuclear program, considered a primary national security threat. The possibility of a military strike is reportedly under examination. In contrast, Meir Ben-Shabbat, former head of the National Security Council, suggested that Israel should target the Iranian nuclear program through diplomatic avenues.

The ability to execute an extensive and effective kinetic operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities on a short notice is doubtful. Such a move is also likely to lead to upheaval in the Middle East, contrary to Israeli officials’ statements that a military response will not lead to a full-scale war with Iran.

Conversely, a precise strike on nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, Araq, or Fordow could not only rekindle international attention toward Iran’s nuclear aspirations, it would also affirm Israel’s commitment to act after several years without significant action in that regard. In doing so, Israel could demonstrate resolve, conveying clearly that it does not accept the nuclear precedent Iran has established in recent years and is willing to take decisive action if necessary, even if opposed or not supported by the international community.

Moreover, a successful attack on a heavily protected target would highlight Israel’s superior capabilities and would undermine the new game rules that Iran attempted to establish. This, in turn, could decrease the likelihood of future attacks on Israeli territory.

Regionally, attacking a nuclear site could bolster Israel’s image as the sole nation daring enough to confront Iran and counter its provocations, particularly following the security breach on October 7. This action could effectively demonstrate Israel’s determination, showcase its military edge.

However, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities carries significant drawbacks.

In the short term, it would considerably increase the likelihood of a retaliatory response from Tehran, potentially even more severe, targeting sensitive locations in Israeli territory, and possibly extending to American and Jordanian interests in the region. This could inhibit the possibility of employing measured escalation levels and quickly lead to a broader conflict.

Hezbollah, which Iran sees as one of its assurances in case of an attack on its nuclear facilities, might be compelled to intensify its assaults against Israel.

Moreover, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities may have the opposite result of prompting an escalation in Iran’s nuclear developments, a pattern previously observed in response to kinetic actions attributed to Israel.

Such an attack could be used by Tehran as a justification and motivation to progress toward nuclear weapons development, confirming that conventional deterrence is insufficient. In recent years—and in past months even more so—senior Iranian figures have increasingly hinted at this possibility.

An overt attack on Iran could also diminish Israel’s legitimacy and international support, which momentarily recovered amid a historic low following the war in Gaza. This erosion could jeopardize diplomatic efforts to establish renewed coalitions and strategies against Iran.

Although it is crucial for Israel to impose a significant cost on Iran in response to its April 13 attack to deter further aggressive actions in the region, targeting nuclear facilities might be strategically disadvantageous.

The costs could heavily outweigh the benefits, and Israel should be prudent to focus on a proportionate response, such as targeting missile and drone infrastructures in Iran or other Iranian assets in the region.

At the same time, it is vital to invest in a substantial political response, such as forming a defensive coalition against the resistance axis and incorporating into it countries threatened by Iran under international auspices. Amid an emerging contest of superpowers in the region and beyond, such a political response also presents an opportunity to foster closer ties and strengthen commitments between these nations and the West.

Assaf Zoran is a research fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is an attorney with 25 years of experience addressing policy and operational issues in the Middle East, engaging in strategic dialogue with decision-makers in Israel and other regions.

Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

IPS UN Bureau

 


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